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This paper is concerned with the question, “Is what a stored-program digital computer 
does thinking-in the full human sense of the term?” Several current controversies are 
examined, including the meaning and usefulness of the Turing test to determine “intelli- 
gence.” The Lucas controversy of the early 1960s is taken up, dealing with the philosophical 
issues related to the man-versus-machine debate, and Dreyfus’ ideas against Machine Intel- 
ligence are explored. Searle’s ideas in opposition to the validity of the Turing test are 
described, as are various interpretations of the Chinese room thought-experiment and its 
relation to real “thought.” Weizenbaum’s opposition to the “information-processing model 
of man” is also developed. The paper concludes with a comparison of the I9thcentury 
debates over Darwinian Evolution and those in this century over Artificial Intelligence. 
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Dieser Aufsatz beschaftigt sich mit der Frage, ob das, was ein mit einem Speicherpro- 
gramm ausgertisteter Digital-Computer tut, Denken ist-im vollen Sinn des menschlichen 
Denkens. Verschiedene bekannte Kontroversen werden untersucht, einschliel3lich der Be- 
deutung und Brauchbarkeit des Turing-Tests zur Bestimmung von “Intelligenz.” Die Lu- 
cas-Kontroverse der frtihen 1960er Jahre, die sich mit philosophischen Problemen der 
Mensch-gegen-Maschine-Debatte befaRte, wird wieder aufgenommen. und die Argumente 
Dreyfus’ gegen eine Maschinen-Intelligenz werden eingehend untersucht. Searle’s Vorstel- 
lungen, die die Giiltigkeit des Turing-Tests in Frage stellen, werden ebenso beschrieben wie 
verschiedenartige Interpretationen des chinesischen Raum-Gedanken-Experiments und 
seine Beziehung zum realen “Gedanken.” Weizenbaums Einwand gegen das “Model1 des 
Menschen als Informationsverarbeiter” wird ebenfalls entwickelt. Der Aufsatz schlieat mit 
einem Vergleich zwischen den Debatten aus dem 19. Jahrhundert urn die Darwinsche Evolu- 
tionstheorie und denen unseres Jahrhunderts urn den Begriff der Kiinstlichen Intelligenz. 
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Cet article traite de la question: Est-ce que ce qu’un programme d’ordinateur fait est 
prnser-dans le plein sens humain du terme? Nous abordons diverses controverses. entre 
autres le sens et I’utilite des testes de Turing pour determiner “l’intelligence.” Nous repre- 
nons la controverse de Lucas, datant du debut annees 60. qui prenait en compte les proble- 
mes philosophiquesrelies au debat homme-versus-machine. Nous explorons aussi les idees 
de Dreyfus contre I’intelligence mecanique. Nous decrivons les idees de Searle s’opposant a 
la validite du teste de Turing ainsi que diverses interpretations de I’experience de pensee de 
la chambre chinoise et de sa relation avec la pen&e “reelle.” Nous nous penchons aussi sur 
I’opposition de Weizenbaum au “modele de I’homme en terme de traitement de I’informa- 
tion.” Une comparaison des debats ayant entoures au XIXieme la theorie de l’evolution de 
Darwin et des debats de notre siecle tournant autour de I’intelligence artiticielle conclut cette 
article. ‘( 19X4 Academic Press. Inc. 
Throughout history, scientific discoveries have given rise to controversies 
about the essential nature of man. The debates still in progress about Darwin’s 
account of human evolution provide an obvious example. Now, there is another. 
Today, we have digital computers that solve problems which, if solved by people, 
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would seem to require intelligence. The field which studies the computer pro- 
grams involved has been given, by John McCarthy, the Aristotelian-sounding 
name of artificial intelligence. As an authoritative source puts it, “Artificial Intelli- 
gence (AI) is the part of computer science concerned with designing intelligent 
computer systems, that is, systems that exhibit the characteristics we associate 
with intelligence in human behavior-understanding language, learning, reason- 
ing, solving problems, and so on” [Barr 1981 I, 31. But is what a stored-program 
digital computer does thinking-in the full human sense of the term? 
How could we possibly find out whether computers think the way we do? The 
question “Can a machine think?” has often been raised. Descartes, for instance 
[Descartes 1637. 56-571 said that no machine could use language as people do, 
responding appropriately to whatever was said to it; nor, he added, could a 
machine be complex enough to behave like a human in every possible circum- 
stance. But only in our century has the question been given widespread and 
thorough discussion. Alan Turing suggested a way of making the question “Can a 
machine think?” testable without having to examine the internal complexity of 
the machine, by giving criteria for the intelligent behavior of computers ]Turing 
19501. If, he said, a machine could successfully imitate a human being in a wide 
range of possible conversations-fooling its human interlocutor into believing the 
machine to be human-we ought to conclude that it was, indeed, thinking. The 
machine’s success in doing this has come to be called passing the Turing test. 
Turing’s proposed test has set the tone for many subsequent debates. The 
questions most often in dispute have been these: First, will machines eventually 
be able to satisfy the Turing test? This is, of course, ultimately an empirical 
question. Second and far more important, is passing the Turing test an adequate 
criterion to identify real understanding on the part of a computer? And finally, 
what are the philosophical and moral implications of the view that the Turing test 
is either satisfiable or adequate? In this paper, I shall outline four controversies of 
the past twenty-five years, each one initiated by a different critic of the claims of 
researchers optimistic about the potential of artificial-intelligence research in gen- 
eral and the ability of computers to pass the Turing test in particular. I will 
discuss, as well, the way technical developments in computer science have condi- 
tioned the content of these controversies. 
Turing himself expected that machines eventually would be able to pass his 
imitation test. It might be objected, he said, that Kurt Godel had proved that there 
were limitations to the power of formal systems. Godel’s theorems show, first, 
that any reasonably rich formal system is incomplete, and, second, that the con- 
sistency of such a system cannot be proved within the system. Turing in 1937 had 
shown that formal systems are equivalent to what machines can do. Thus com- 
puters are subject to the limitations Godel established for formal systems. 
Turing’s reply was that people, too, may well be subject to such limitations 
[Turing 1950, 2109-21 lo]. Thus Turing, at the beginning of the modern debate 
over Artificial Intelligence, had already implied this startling contention: if com- 
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puters think the way we do, a human being is in effect an instance of a formal 
system. 
The British philosopher J. R. Lucas was not convinced by Turing’s response to 
this objection, and in [Lucas 19611 tried to strengthen the objection. In so doing, 
he began the first of the controversies we shall consider. Lucas’ tools were those 
of mathematical logic, but his goal was much broader: here, at the outset of 
attempts to build thinking machines, Lucas wanted to refute what he called 
“mechanism’‘-that is, the view that the whole mind is just the sum of the 
operation of its separate parts, where each part’s operation depends solely on its 
past states or on random choices between states [Lucas 1961, 1261, the view that 
the mind is a machine. Since, as Turing had shown, a machine is just an embodied 
formal system, Godel’s incompleteness theorem applies to the machine. But, 
Lucas continued, by standing outside the consistent, incomplete formal system, 
we see some unprovable, meaningful formula to be true [Lucas 1961, 1131. The 
machine cannot produce the formula; we see the formula as true; so a human can 
beat every machine [Ibid., 1151. Moreover, if the human mind were nothing but an 
instance of a formal system, Godel’s other theorem would say that the mind could 
not conclude itself to be consistent. But, Lucas argues, we do in fact assert our 
own consistency [Ibid., 1241. Thus no mechanical model of the mind can ever be 
adequate. 
Lucas’ attempt to show that Godel’s theorem refuted mechanism provoked 
impassioned responses. Some simply criticized the technical aspects of his argu- 
ment, asserting that he erred in his analysis and application of Godel’s theorem 
[Benecerraf 1967, 18; Good 1967, 357-358; Webb 1968, 156, 163, 1731. Others 
argued that Lucas had too limited a view of machines [Benecerraf 1967, 13-141. 
Machines, for instance, which could reprogram themselves when their environ- 
ments changed would not be subject to Lucas’ arguments (although their potential 
could not be described by the study of formal systems a la Turing either) [George 
1962, 621. Most important for our purposes, some accused Lucas of holding too 
exalted a view of man. If a specific machine may not be able to assert the true- 
though-unprovable Godel formula, people cannot always do this either [Whitely 
1962, 61; Webb 1968, 1681. Finally, rather than suggest that our self-knowledge 
shows we are better than machines, one can reverse the argument and say that 
Lucas’ paper really implies (since formal systems cannot know themselves) that 
human self-knowledge is not possible [Benecerraf 1967, 301. 
The Lucas controversy, arising as it did in the early 196Os, dealt with philosoph- 
ical possibilities, before actual machines had been programmed to show much 
intelligent-looking behavior. But, unlike the situation in Descartes’ time, the pio- 
neering programs were actually being written. As often happens in an expanding 
new field, as research went on, AI workers repeatedly claimed that they were 
close to success-success in simulating human thought. Thus the philosophical 
debates about what could be done, and about the nature of human thought, be- 
came bound up with the empirical questions of what had been done, and of 
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whether there were any examples of machine “thought.” In 1965, philosopher 
Hubert Dreyfus wrote a report for RAND called “Alchemy and Artificial Intelli- 
gence,” which he eventually expanded into a provocative book entitled What 
Computers Can’t Do [Dreyfus 1972, 19791. In that work, after surveying a large 
body of then-existing AI programs, Dreyfus argued that as a matter of simple fact, 
not even the most highly touted AI programs should be called “intelligent” [Drey- 
fus 1979, 91-1481. Moreover, Dreyfus pointed out, AI researchers had vastly 
oversold the future potential of their work; predictions which had been made 
earlier (in ten years a computer will be world chess champion, discover and prove 
an important new mathematical theorem, translate natural languages) had clearly 
not come to pass [Dreyfus 1979, 81-82,91-921. And to these empirical criticisms, 
Dreyfus joined a philosophical argument: these things had not happened because 
they could not. But unlike Lucas, Dreyfus took his philosophical weapons not 
from logic but from phenomenology. AI work, Dreyfus said, rests on the false 
assumption that the human mind works by operating on bits of information, and 
performs its operation according to formal rules [Ibid., 1561. But the mind does 
not do this, he said. Computers, he continued, lack such human qualities as 
tolerance of ambiguity and the ability to distinguish between the essential and the 
inessential [Ibid., 107, 1121. Dreyfus asserted that man is “not a fact or a set of 
facts, but a being who creates both himself and the world of facts in the process of 
living in the world” [Ibid., 190-1911. If man is like this, then programmed com- 
puters can never satisfy the Turing test. Trying to imitate human intelligence with 
computers, Dreyfus has concluded, is like trying to get to the moon by climbing 
higher and higher in trees [McCorduck 1979, 1801. 
Dreyfus’ views were met with outrage by many in the AI community. Seymour 
Papert laid Dreyfus’ views to the hostility common to people who have never 
programmed a computer [McCorduck 1979, 1961. More substantively, practition- 
ers of the field argued that Dreyfus’ empirical description of AI work was both 
flawed-and outdated [Wilks 1976. 177. 181: Pylyshyn 1974. 751. Furthermore, 
said Yorick Wilks, Dreyfus’ extrapolations about the limited future of AI research 
are the same kind of argument as Descartes’ assertion of the impossibility of the 
vacuum [Wilks 1976, 1771. Moreover, the phenomenological arguments Dreyfus 
used to support his position are, according to his critics, neither empirically based 
nor intellectually rigorous (Edward Feigenbaum called phenomenology “cotton 
candy” [McCorduck 1979, 1971). In fact, we are so far from understanding the 
processes people use in thinking that the only way we even know that other 
human beings think is by the Turing test [Wilks 1976, 1831. 
The third of the controversies I will discuss began with a direct attack on the 
adequacy of the Turing test itself. In 1980, philosopher John Searle argued that 
even passing the Turing test would not mean that the machine thinks or under- 
stands. Imagine a computer program written to simulate the understanding of 
Chinese. Now imagine an imitation of this program by a person, knowing no 
Chinese, locked in a room with a lot of boxes filled with Chinese ideographs and 
with a book of rules in English that tells how to match up one Chinese ideograph 
HM 11 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 475 
with another, People outside the room pass the man Chinese symbols; obeying the 
instructions in the book, he passes other Chinese symbols back out to them. His 
thoughts about the process are just, “Oh, it’s squiggle, so I must give back 
squoggle.” But the rules in the book are so thorough that the man’s response to 
the symbols given him are what one would expect from a fluent speaker of Chi- 
nese. Thus the man passes the Turing test, but he does not understand Chinese, 
and so the machine he and his program are an instance of do not understand 
Chinese either [Searle 1980a, 417-4191. Thus the Turing test is inadequate; and 
the thesis that a computer with an appropriate program is really a mind, or, 
equivalently, the thesis that the mind is just an appropriately programmed com- 
puter, is wrong. The Turing test, said Searle, is “unashamedly behavioristic and 
operationalistic,” and people who accept it miss the distinction between simula- 
tion and duplication [Searle 1980a, 4231. 
Replies to Searle’s argument included cries of “sophistry” and “religious dia- 
tribe” [Dennett 1980, 428; Hofstadter 1980, 4331. Criticism of the argument itself 
included the statement that the total system really does contain understanding. 
The man may not understand Chinese, but the whole system does; if one were to 
look at the human brain up close, the process would look just the way the Chinese 
room looks to us-we are too small to see that (and how) the system understands 
Chinese [Lycan 1980, 435; McCarthy 1980, 435; Wilensky 1980, 4501. Some see 
real danger in rejecting the behavioristic approach, in which scientific models are 
used to represent reality [Marshall 1980,435-4361; they warn against the “anthro- 
pocentric chauvinism” [Pylyshyn 1980, 4431 that abandoning behavioral criteria 
might entail. Rorty [ 1980, 4451 sees Searle’s insistence on the difference between 
the Chinese room simulation and real human thought as equivalent to an orthodox 
Catholic’s argument that the Eucharist conducted by a “demythologizing Tilli- 
chian theologian” or even an Anglican does not transform the wafer into the Body 
of Christ. In reply to such defenses of behavioral equivalence, Eccles [I9801 cites 
an experiment by Eric Lenneberg testing the linguistic understanding of David 
Premack’s symbol-manipulating chimpanzees. The chimpanzees successfully ma- 
nipulate the symbols, but this does not mean that they have language as Premack 
has claimed, because, said Lenneberg, high school students, manipulating the 
symbols just as Sarah the chimp did (and with fewer errors), reported that they 
thought they were solving puzzles, and were unable to translate a single one of 
their completed “sentences” correctly into English ([Lenneberg 19751, cited in 
[Eccles 1980, 4301). 
Finally, some argued that Searle underestimated machines. They suggested 
programs embedded in robots, capable of learning from environmental stimuli not 
only which squoggle follows which squiggle, but what happens in the world when 
the system makes that reply. In this situation, the programmed machine would 
actually learn to understand Chinese [Dennett 1980, 4291. But Searle, in his reply 
to his critics, accepts this as a possibility, arguing that whether this can actually be 
done is an empirical question [Searle 1980b, 4511. The Chinese room thought- 
experiment shows, Searle concludes, that merely being an instance of a formal 
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program is not enough; so that just passing the Turing test does not prove that the 
system is thinking. 
The debate initiated by Searle provided much clarification of the issues sur- 
rounding the Turing test; it also placed on record some concessions on both sides: 
that whether or not a computer could simulate types of human understanding is a 
matter for empirical test [Searle 1980b, 4531, and that present-day computer pro- 
grams “cannot be said to be truly understanding” [Schank 1980,445]. But asking 
whether the Turing test enables us to recognize another intelligence has other 
implications -moral ones-which are explored in detail in the last of the contro- 
versies I will consider. 
In 1966, Joseph Weizenbaum of MIT developed a computer program which 
could simulate, in limited circumstances, a psychotherapist of the school of Carl 
Rogers [Weizenbaum 1966,36-371; (compare [Weizenbaum 1976,3-41). A sample 
of its performance follows: 
[Patient] Men are all alike. 
[“Doctor”] IN WHAT WAY 
They’re always bugging us about something or other. 
CAN YOU THINK OF A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE 
Well, my boyfriend made me come here. 
. . * 
WHAT WOULD IT MEAN TO YOU IF YOU GOT 
SOME HELP 
Perhaps I could learn to get along with my mother. 
TELL ME MORE ABOUT YOUR FAMILY 
. . . 
My father is afraid of everybody. 
WHAT ELSE COMES TO MIND WHEN YOU THINK 
OF YOUR FATHER 
Bullies. 
DOES THAT HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE 
FACT THAT YOUR BOYFRIEND MADE YOU 
COME HERE [Ibid.] 
The accomplishment looks impressive, but is less so when the mechanism is 
revealed. The program responds to specified cues in specified ways: for instance, 
to words like “mother” with “tell me more about your family”; to statements 
involving “always” or “all” with requests for an example; and to statements that 
do not fit the predetermined script by repeating them, or, more subtly, by fishing 
with “does that have anything to do with” some previous topic whose importance 
to the patient was signaled by having been prefaced with the word “my.” 
Weizenbaum thought he had written a clever program; he did not dream that 
people would believe that the program could think. But people did. It was sug- 
gested by some that the program had passed the Turing test (as reported in 
[Denning 1983, 23; Boden 1977,96-97; McCorduck 1979, 225 n., 226 n.]). It was 
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also suggested that such programs could practice therapy cheaply and on a large 
scale [Colby et al. 1966; Sagan 1975, lo]; (both quoted in [Weizenbaum 1976, 51). 
Weizenbaum was shocked by these responses because they implied such wide- 
spread acceptance of the view that human beings were basically just complicated 
machines. In his book Computer Power and Human Reason, Weizenbaum char- 
acterized the information-processing model of man as just one aspect of a com- 
mon 20th~century mind-set that views human beings as means, rather than as 
ends, and which falsely regards human problems as largely having technical solu- 
tions [Weizenbaum 1976, 11, 13-14, 251, 2751. His book is an argument that the 
information-processing model of man is both empirically false and morally wrong. 
Like Dreyfus, Weizenbaum argued that people can do things machines cannot- 
for instance, we can understand natural language in a context of experiences, like 
love and trust, that machines cannot share [Weizenbaum 1976,208-2091. Weizen- 
baum characterized the most successful AI programs of the early 1970s as lacking 
strong theory-based models of human intelligence, being instead collections of ad 
hoc programming tricks [Ibid., 2321. Weizenbaum concluded his critique with a 
call to those involved in the computer-science profession not to promulgate a view 
of human beings which helps to further dehumanize them. “The computer is a 
powerful new metaphor for helping us to understand many aspects of the world, 
but. . . it enslaves the mind that has no other metaphors and few other resources 
to call on” [Weizenbaum 1976, 2771. And again, “What could it mean to speak of 
risk, courage, trust, endurance, and overcoming when one speaks of machines?” 
[Ibid., 2801. 
Weizenbaum’s book, like Dreyfus’, provoked outrage and attacks on his scien- 
tific competence, like “He fell out of the field ten years ago, and hasn’t done a 
damn thing since ELIZA [the psychiatrist program]” (quoted in [McCorduck 
1979, 3181). His views on the potential of dangerous directions in some AI re- 
search have caused him to be confused with romantic critics of science and 
technology like Theodore Roszak, and have provoked responses to his critique of 
AI which are in fact general defenses of the benevolence of technology [McCor- 
duck 1979. 326; Bell 1979, 460-461; Dertouzos 1979, 4631; and [Lederberg 19761 
(quoted in [McCorduck 1979.3211). But these responses do not invalidate Weizen- 
baum’s central point: thinking of people as programmed machines will affect the 
decisions we make about how to treat people in our technical society. 
It is at present fairly widely agreed that no computer program has come any- 
where near satisfying the Turing test. One might think, then, that ongoing re- 
search should have had little bearing on the debates about AI’s philosophical 
implications so far. But this is not the case. Turing’s logical tools-notably the 
abstract concept of the Turing machine-for studying computing machines, and 
the increasing capabilities of digital computers, are what provoked Lucas’s at- 
tempt to use logical tools to defend a nonmechanistic view of man. The early 
successes of AI research produced a round of enthusiastic predictions about 
“duplicating the problem-solving and information-handling capabilities of the 
brain” ([Simon 19601, quoted in [Weizenbaum 1976,245]); their nonfulfillment and 
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their naive optimism gave Dreyfus’ critique added force. Again, the success of 
Weizenbaum’s ELIZA program produced more utopian predictions, many from 
outside the computer-science community altogether, and these in turn produced 
Weizenbaum’s impassioned plea for respect for human reason. 
Meanwhile, the direction of AI research in the 1970s began to change, from 
general problem solving to more successful programs limited to specific fields like 
medicine or geology-programs based on incorporating large amounts of system- 
atized human knowledge. Duda & Shortliffe [I9831 describe some specialized 
“expert systems” that can, in their limited domains like diagnosis of bacterial 
infections or prospecting for certain mineral ores, perform as well as human 
experts. Perhaps surprisingly, the power of such knowledge-based programs, 
whose success is based on systematizing existing human knowledge rather than 
simulating general problem-solving power, strengthened the hand of critics like 
Weizenbaum and Searle. Immense practical achievements which are theoretically 
modest had, at least temporarily, reinforced an attitude of modesty about the 
nature of machine intelligence. 
However, this modesty is by no means universal (see, e.g., [Feigenbaum & 
McCorduck 1983, 44-451. and the report in [Waldrop 1984, 12801). Thus there is 
now another division, not between involved researchers and outside critics, but 
between the designers of specialized expert systems and those with more grandi- 
ose aims, between those trying to make programs “smart” by building on human 
knowledge as necessary and those seeking programs with general intelligence 
[Waldrop 1984, 1279-12801. 
The 20th-century debates over artificial intelligence can, I think, be better un- 
derstood from the perspective of an analogy from the history of science. In estab- 
lishing its legitimacy as a mature field of science, Darwinism had to contend not 
only with attacks on evolution from those horrified by the idea of man as an 
animal, but also with some Darwinists who used evolution as a basis for doctrines 
of white supremacy, robber-baron economics, and atheistic materialism. Simi- 
larly, while AI researchers sometimes paint their critics as undervaluing or oppos- 
ing all AI research, their critics see AI researchers as ideologues extrapolating 
successful researches in limited areas into a dehumanizing world-view for which 
there is no scientific support. Perhaps as AI continues to mature, it will more 
closely resemble a science solving problems in its own sphere of competence. 
rather than a philosophical position claiming the ultimate truth about the nature of 
human intelligence. 
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